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Abstract
We study interaction between the trips of two types of drivers on a two-lane road who
differ by their desired speeds. The difference in desired speeds causes congestion,
because slow drivers force fast drivers to reduce their speed. An interesting aspect of
this type of congestion is that results with respect to tolling are very different from
those of the classical Pigou-Knight model where the marginal external costs are an
increasing function of the number of road users. In our model we find the opposite
result: the marginal external costs of slow drivers are a decreasing function of the
number of slow drivers. This leads to rather different policy recommendations. In
many situations either laissez faire (no tolling or traffic restrictions) or prohibition of
slow drivers to enter the road is in practice (i.e. taking into account costs associated
with tolling) the optimal policy. This conclusion hardly changes if the possibility of
overtaking is introduced into the model.
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21 Introduction
In this paper we study what may be considered to be the most elementary form of
traffic congestion: drivers who are unable to maintain their desired speed because of
slower traffic in front of them. This form of congestion is well known to each car
driver. It is also relatively easy to model in a structural way, because the causal
relations involved are simple. Many other models of congestion (the bottleneck model
of Arnott et al. (1993) is an important exception) use a relationship between demand
(or traffic flow or density) and travel time (or speed) of a reduced form character,
usually the ‘fundamental diagram’.  We prefer to model the mechanism that leads to
congestion explicitly. This implies that the impacts of slow drivers on fast drivers
have to be modeled.
Tzedakis (1980) is, as far as we know the first study of congestion caused by different
vehicle speeds.2 His study refers to a single lane where traffic enters with stochastic
arrival times. In Verhoef, Rouwendal and Rietveld (1999) we studied congestion
caused by speed differences without overtaking in a situation with deterministic
arrival times. Although the deterministic arrival times have some advantages for
elaborating the model, the realism of this assumption is, of course, questionable. Even
for rail traffic with a fixed schedule of trains, there are random delays. Huisman and
Boucherie (1999) have recently studied the implications of this for actual running
times on railway sections with two types of trains (with different speeds for each
type), although with different methods than we adopt here. We have not been able to
find something like an economic analysis of overtaking on two lane roads. We have
only one example of a study on platoon formation on two lane roads, Barzily and
Rubinovitch (1979) who develop a model in which road sections on which overtaking
is either completely unrestricted or impossible alternate. In fact they model the
situation as a three-lane highway in which the lane in the middle is divided into
sections that are alternately reserved for traffic in both directions. This study does not
give an economic analysis of the congestion implied by platoon formation.
In this paper we study traffic on a road used by two types of drivers who are identified
by their desired speeds. Slow drivers have a lower desired speed than fast drivers and
the presence of the former type of drivers causes congestion for the latter type. The
extent of congestion in this context, and various policy measures to deal with it are the
subject of this paper.
The situation studied in the paper is a two-lane road with cars driving in both
directions. It is assumed that the same types of drivers are present on both lanes,
although possibly in different numbers.
We start our analysis by considering the situation in which overtaking is impossible or
prohibited and introduce the possibility of overtaking later on. It will be argued in the
sections that follow that tolling is hardly a useful policy for traffic control under these
circumstances and that other measures (such as prohibiting slow drivers to enter some
roads) should be considered instead.
An obvious, but costly, possibility to relieve congestion problems of the type
considered here would be to make a second lane available for traffic in each direction.
Except for very high levels of traffic demand, all congestion will then disappear if
there are only two types of drivers. In reality the second lane is often the one used by
the traffic proceeding in the opposite direction, and this implies that it is only
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 Wardrop’s (1952) classical paper discusses speed differences and the associated necessity of frequent
overtaking. It suggests to use the ratio of actual to desired overtakings as a measure of congestion, but
does not analyse this type of congestion itself.
3available for overtaking if sufficiently large gaps occur in oncoming traffic. This
situation is studied in the second part of the paper.
2 Overtaking impossible or prohibited
Preliminaries
We consider traffic on a road segment of finite, but arbitrary, length l. This road
segment has two lanes and traffic moving in opposite directions on both lanes.
Overtaking may either be prohibited or impossible (e.g. because the lanes are
physically separated). The next section will consider the situation in which overtaking
is possible if traffic on the other lane allows a driver to do so. In the present section
attention may be limited to drivers on a single lane.
There are two types of drivers on the road: those belonging to the first group have a
preferred speed s1 and those belonging to the second group a preferred speed s2. We
assume that s1>s2 and will often refer to drivers in the first group as ‘fast’ and to
drivers in the second as ‘slow.’ We assume that both types of drivers choose their
preferred speeds unless the circumstances on the road force them to reduce it.
In general one would expect speeds to be chosen endogenously on the basis of travel
conditions. In situations without congestion drivers have a preferred speed that
depends on the conditions of the road. Our analysis assumes homogeneous travel
conditions, and hence a constant speed for both types of drivers. Since there are only
two types of drivers, slow drivers can always use their preferred speeds and it seems
natural to assume that they will do so.3 For fast drivers the situation is somewhat
different. If they anticipate the necessity to slow down because of a slow driver in
front of them, they may decide to slow down gradually instead of maintaining their
own preferred speed as long as possible. However, even though incorporating this
behavior into our model may result in a more realistic picture of actual traffic, it will
not change the results about congestion as long as the fast drivers are as close as
possible behind the slow drivers when leaving the road segment that we study.4 The
total travel time of fast drivers does not depend on the way they reduce their speed
when they are forced to reduce speed because of slow driver in front of them.
Demand for trips on the road segment, expressed in the number of cars per time unit,
will be denoted as Pi, i=1,2. The costs associated with a trip consist of expected travel
time wi and possibly a toll zi. It seems natural to assume that for both types of drivers
demand is a decreasing function of the generalised travel cost, i.e. the sum of the
monetary value of expected travel time wi and a possible toll zi. The inverse demand
function gi, i=1,2 can then be written as:
gi(Pi) =  vi wi + zi , i=1,2. 1
where vi is group i’s valuation of travel time which is assumed to be a strictly positive
number.
                                                       
3
 If the risk of accidents influences the preferred speed, one can imagine that the presence of fast
drivers will reduce their speed even more. However, this may increase the risk of accidents and a more
rational reaction may be that slow drivers  increase their preferred speed. Since an analysis of this issue
would take us too far from the scope of the present papers, we assume a preferred speed that is
independent of traffic conditions.
4
 Fast drivers have an incentive to do so if the end of the road segment coincides with a junction, or a
possibility for overtaking which would give them an opportunity to return to their higher preferred
speed.
4In this section we consider the situation in which traffic is restricted to a single lane.
As soon as a fast driver is forced to slow down, he drives at the low speed of his
leader until the end of the road segment.
The demand functions will be used to derive optimal tolls, but before we are able to
do this, we first have to consider how travel times are related to demand.
Minimum distance
We assume that a minimum distance d* must be maintained between the fronts of
subsequent cars on the same road. If the distance between two subsequent cars
becomes equal to d* the follower will reduce its speed to that of the leader. In the
situations to be considered in this paper, the close proximity of a slow driver in front
of a fast driver is the only reason why fast drivers reduce speed. Slow drivers are
always able to maintain their preferred speed.
Capacity of the road
If car A enters the road segment, a following car, car B, can enter only after car A has
moved d* meters on the road segment. If car A has a slow driver, this takes d*/s2 time
units, if it has a fast driver d*/s1 units. In order to keep the presentation simple, we
assume that always d*/s2 seconds pass before another car enters the road segment.5
The maximum capacity c of the road segment, defined in this way, is therefore equal
to:
*/
)/*/(1
2
2
ds
sdc
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It is assumed throughout the paper that the demand for trips does not exceed the
capacity of the road.
Arrivals
During the first d*/s2 seconds after entrance of a car, the arrival rate equals 0, but
otherwise it takes on the constant value O.6 The density function of the additional time
t until arrival of the next car is therefore f(t)=O exp(-Ot),  with expectation 1/O.
O is the sum of the arrival rates of fast and slow cars, denoted as O1 and O2,
The arrival rates Oi are of course related to demand Pi. In fact the arrival rates would
be equal to the demand volumes if the requirement of a minimum time between the
arrival of subsequent cars had not been made. Because cars cannot enter arbitrarily
soon after each other, the expected number of cars entering the road segment is
smaller than O1 + O2, implying that the arrival rate must be higher than P1+ P2.
In order to derive the relationship between arrival rates and demand, we set demand
equal to the expected number of arrivals. The expected value of the time that elapses
between the entrance of subsequent cars is d*/s2+1/O, and the expected number of cars
E(n) that enter during one time unit is therefore equal to E(n)=O/(Od*/s2+1).
In order to make this number equal to P1+ P2, O should be equal to:
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 Robin Lindsey informed us that the California Uniform Vehicle Code stipulates that drivers maintain
a two-second headway behind the vehicle ahead of them. This would justify our assumption.
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 Alternatively, we could have assumed a constant arrival rate, in combination with the possible
existence of a queue on the on ramp. This would complicate our derivations, but would probably not
change the results. We have therefore adopted the simpler approach.
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If the capacity of the road is large, O will be close to P1+P2, as one should expect.
For each car that enters the road there is fixed probability p=P1 /(P1+P2) that it is fast,
and a complementary probability (1-p) that it is slow. The arrival rates of both types
of  drivers are therefore:
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Travel times
The main interest of this paper is in congestion, and therefore in the time needed to
travel across the road segment. For a slow driver this time is always equal to:
2
2
s
l
w  . 5
Clearly, slow drivers do not experience congestion. Fast drivers may experience
congestion because of the presence of slow drivers on the road segment at the time
they travel it. Since a stochastic process determines the arrivals of both fast and slow
drivers, travel time for the fast drivers is a random variable. It is shown in the
Appendix that its expected value is equal to:
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It is immediately clear from this formula that expected travel time for the fast drivers
is at most equal to l/s2, the travel time for the slow drivers. It will, of course, only
reach this limit if every fast driver is forced to slow down to the lower speed
immediately after entering the road. This happens when O2 becomes very large and
the second term on the right hand side of the formula vanishes.
It follows also from the formula that expected travel time approaches its upper bound
l/s2-1/O2 if the length of the road becomes very large. The reason is that on a very long
road a fast car will be usually be forced to slow down by a slow car when a small part
of the road has been travelled. (This small part may, of course, be a large number of
kilometres.)
Although it is not obvious from the formula, it can be shown (see the Appendix) that
for  O2o0 expected travel time for fast drivers becomes equal to l/s1, the travel time of
fast drivers who experience no congestion, as should be expected.
Expected travel time is an increasing function of the arrival rate O2 as should also be
expected. However, as shown in the appendix, travel time is a concave function of the
arrival rate. This is worthy to be stressed, since it has important consequences for
tolling. The economic analysis of traffic congestion in the tradition of Pigou and
Knight assumes a convex relation between traffic demand and travel time.
6It is also noteworthy that the arrival rate for fast drivers, O1, does not appear in the
formula for the travel times of these drivers. Neither the travel time of the fast drivers
nor that of the slow drivers depends on the arrival rate of fast drivers. This suggests
that optimal tolling would require a toll for slow drivers only. Although it will be
shown below that this is actually not completely true, it is usually a good
approximation to the truth.
Demand and travel time
Substitution of equations 3 (for i=2) into 5 gives the desired relation between the
travel time of fast drivers and demands:
¸
¸
¹
·
¨
¨
©
§
¸
¸
¹
·
¨
¨
©
§
¸¸
¹
·
¨¨
©
§




 
1221
2
2
21
2
1 /)(1exp1
/)(1
s
l
s
l
c
c
s
l
w
PP
P
P
PP 7
It is clear from this formula that the travel time of fast cars on the road segment
depends on the demand for trips of slow drivers as well as on that of fast drivers.
If total demand approaches the capacity c, both arrival rates O1 and O2 will become
very large and the expected travel time close to its maximum value l/s2.
Optimal tolls
Optimal tolls can be derived by maximising the social surplus, i.e. the sum of the
consumer surpluses of both types of drivers and the toll revenues under appropriate
side conditions (see the appendix, where also the possibility of boundary solutions is
discussed). If an interior solution is relevant, the optimal tolls satisfy the following
equations:
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These formulas are not too surprising, but their elaboration is more interesting. For
the purpose of computing the optimal tolls it is more convenient to use the alternative,
but equivalent formulas that start from equation 6 instead of 7 and use the chain rule
to complete the derivation:
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For positive demands of both types of drivers, all partial derivatives appearing in
equation 8 are positive, and so are the tolls.
Further elaboration allows one to write the optimal tolls as:
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From the way these equations are written down, it is clear that the toll for slow drivers
is always higher than that for fast drivers. The difference will be small if demand for
trips by slow drivers is large, and the difference will be large if demand for trips by
slow drivers is small. In particular, it can be shown that:
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This implies an inverse relationship between the level of the congestion toll for slow
driver and the level of congestion itself, which is at variance with the results from the
Pigou-Knight analysis. The reason for the inverse relationship is the fact that a fast
driver who is forced to slow down by a slow driver is, from that moment on,
insensitive to the precence of more slow drivers on the road. Additional slow drivers
can only hinder fast drivers who are not already forced to slow down by the presence
of the slow drivers already using the road. Since the number of ‘free flowing’ fast
drivers is a decreasing function of the number of slow drivers, the additional
congestion caused by an extra slow driver will decrease. An example will clarify this.
An example
Consider a road with a length of 10 kilometers where fast drivers want to drive 80
kilometers per hour, and slow drivers 60 kilometers per hour. The minimum required
distance between (the noses of) subsequent vehicles is 20 meters, which implies that
capacity equals 3000 cars per hour. Such a road may be thought of as one connecting
two villages in a rural area. If overtaking is impossible or prohibited on that road,
expected travel time for fast drivers is given by equation 5. The travel time for slow
cars on this road is equal to 10 minutes (0.166 hours).
Figure 1 shows the relations between the travel time of fast drivers and the volume of
their demand for trips on the road. The lowest line in that figure refers to a situation in
which the demand for trips by slow drivers is very low: 1 car per hour. The figure
shows that in that case the curve is similar to the ones usually presented in the Pigou-
Knight analysis of congestion. Travel time is close to its minimum value unless the
number of fast drivers approaches the capacity sufficiently close.
The Figure also shows that this relationship changes remarkably for even moderately
high levels of demand for trips by slow drivers. Travel time of fast drivers becomes an
almost linear function of their demand for trips that flattens out for higher levels of
demand by slow drivers. This suggests that it will be interesting to look also to the
relationship between the travel time of fast drivers and the demand for trips by slow
drivers.
8Figure 1 The relationship between the number of fast drivers and their travel time  for
various numbers of slow drivers.
Figure 2 pictures that relation. One line in the picture refers to a situation in which
demand of fast drivers is very low (1 driver per hour), and demand by slow drivers
can vary over almost the full range from 0 to 3000. The figure shows that travel time
of fast drivers is, in this case, a steeply increasing function of the demand by slow
drivers as long as this demand is small. For higher volumes of demand by slow
drivers, travel time of fast drivers is almost equal to that of slow drivers (one sixth of
an hour) and insensitive to further increases in the demand by slow drivers. Similar
lines can be drawn for other volumes of the demand for trips by fast drivers. These
other lines are all remarkably similar to the one shown in the picture. The most
important difference is that they end at an earlier level of demand by slow drivers,
because of the capacity constraint. In Figure 2 a second line is drawn that is based on
demand by fast drivers that equals 1500. It appears therefore from the picture that the
travel time of fast drivers is hardly dependent on the demand for trips by either fast or
slow drivers, unless the latter demand is small, i.e. in the range of 0 to 400 cars per
hour. Note the concavity of the lines drawn in the figure.
Figures 3 and 4 show the marginal external costs, expressed in time units, for fast and
slow drivers as a function of the volume of their demand, for various levels of the
demand by the alternative type of drivers. The marginal external costs are equal to the
optimal tolls if the corresponding levels of demand would be the equilibrium levels.
Figure 3 shows the pattern that is well known from the Pigou-Knight analysis when
the number of slow drivers is very low (1 driver per hour). For higher volumes of
demand by slow drivers, optimal tolls for fast drivers become very low.
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9Figure 2 The relationship between the number of slow drivers and the travel time of
fast drivers for various numbers of fast drivers
The curves drawn in Figure 4 are completely different. They show that the optimal
toll for slow drivers are a decreasing function of their demand for trips. The reason
for this phenomenon is the concavity of the curves shown in Figure 2. An additional
slow driver increases the travel time of fast drivers especially when the number of
slow drivers is still small. When their number is large, travel time of the fast drivers is
already close to its maximum, and cannot increase further.
The optimal toll for the first slow drivers that enter the road is highly dependent on
the volume of the demand for trips by fast drivers. If this is very small (1 driver per
hour) the optimal toll is negligible (the curve is indistinguishable from the horizontal
axis). However, when demand is moderately large (50 cars per hour or more) optimal
tolls for slow drivers can be much larger than those for fast drivers. Figure 4 shows
that it can be equal to the monetary value of 1 hour if demand by fast drivers equals
1000 cars per hour, and it can become much higher (more than 10 hours) for higher
levels of demand by fast drivers.
Discussion
We have just seen that the optimal toll for slow drivers is a decreasing function of the
volume of their demand for trips (at least for the parameters values that have been
used in constructing the figures). The toll approaches zero even for moderate values
of demand by slow drivers (say 200 cars per hour).
In the Pigou-Knight analysis of traffic congestion it is conventional to regard the
curve that gives the price for the trip (including a possible toll) as similar to the supply
curve in the analysis of market equilibrium. The analogous picture under the present
circumstances is shown in Figure 5. The figure shows a linear inverse demand curve
that crosses the vertical axis at 2, implying that the maximum value attached to a trip
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Figure 3 The relationship between the number of fast drivers and their marginal
external costs for various numbers of slow drivers
Figure 4 The relationship between the number of slow drivers and their marginal
external costs for various numbers of fast drivers
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1
41
7
83
3
12
49
16
65
20
81
24
97
29
13
number of fast drivers/hr
m
ar
gi
na
l e
x
te
rn
al
 
co
st
 
(h
rs
)
1 slow car/hr
5 slow cars/hr
20 slow cars/hr
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1 33 65 97 12
9
16
1
19
3
22
5
number of slow drivers/hr
m
ar
gi
n
al
 
ex
te
rn
al
 
co
st
 
(hr
s)
1 fast car/hr
50 fast
cars/hr
100 fast
cars/hr
500 fast
cars/hr
1000 fast
cars/hr
11
on the road segment is the (monetary) equivalent of two hours travel time. The
maximum number of trips per unit of time demanded by slow drivers is 250 if travel
costs would be equal to zero. The figure also shows the travel time on the road
segment. Without policy measures, the market equilibrium would be at the point
where the demand curve crosses the horizontal line corresponding to the travel time.
Finally, the picture shows two supply curves that give social travel cost as a function
of demand for trips by slow drivers. The ‘supply’ curve is simply the sum of the travel
time of slow cars and the marginal external cost. It is assumed that demand for trips of
fast drivers is inelastic and the figure shows the supply curve for various levels of this
fixed demand. In both cases shown the supply curve crosses the demand curve at a
point where the toll is relatively low and demand of slow drivers is close to what it
would be in a situation without tolling. This situation, which we call (i) is the first
candidate for an optimum. However, more such points can be distinguished.
Figure 5 ‘Market equilibria’ for slow drivers at various levels of inelastic demand of
fast drivers
If the demand for trips of fast drivers is high, there may be a second point where the
two curves cross. At this point the optimal toll is so high that demand for trips by slow
drivers is reduced to a very small value. This is situation (ii). However, situation (ii)
can never be an optimum since the supply curve crosses the demand curve from
above. Situation (ii) therefore refers to a minimum.7
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The third possibility we have to consider is one in which the number of slow drivers is
equal to 0, situation (iii). In this situation the marginal external cost of slow drivers is
infinitely high (see eq. 10), increasing the number of slow drivers will at first always
decrease the social surplus as long as g2(0) is finite (as we assume). Hence, situation
iii is a local corner maximum. The only way to show whether it is a global maximum
as well is by comparison with situation (i). If we denote the supply curve as s(P2) and
the number of slow drivers in situation (i) as P*, then we can write the difference in
social surplus between situations (iii) and (i) as:
³  
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If the demand curve is non-linear, there may of course be more points at which supply
and demand curve cross and more candidates for a global maximum. However, the
supply curve is always very steep at extremely low levels of  demand of slow drivers
and almost horizontal for even moderate levels of that demand. This suggest that in
many cases a situation like (i) will correspond with a maximal social surplus. In such
a situation the optimum is very close to a fourth possibly optimal situation, viz. one in
which no policy measures are taken. Even small costs associated with tolling will
make such this situation (iv) of laissez faire the real optimum.
In conclusion, under the circumstances studied here, tolling does not seem to be a
very effective policy if one wants to maximize social surplus. If situation (i) is the
optimum, even small costs associated with tolling make it preferable to do nothing. If
situation (iii) is the optimum, complete prohibition of slow drivers to enter the road is
the optimal instrument.
A numerical example
Figure 5 was drawn on the assumption of a completely inelastic demand for trips by
fast drivers and we maintained that assumption throughout the discussion of the
previous subsection. If demand is elastic, the supply curve for the slow drivers can
only be drawn on the basis of some assumption on the number of fast drivers.
However, except for very low levels of demand for trips by slow drivers, these supply
curves can hardly be distinguished from each other and we do not expect much harm
from this tacit assumption. It may, nevertheless, be useful to provide a numerical
illustration for the more general case in which demand for trips by fast drivers is also
elastic. We will not derive supply curves, but only compare the four situations listed
above.
We consider again the same road segment but now we suppose that the inverse
demand curves of both types of drivers are linear. For simplicity, the value of time is
taken to be equal to 1 for both types of drivers. The intercept of the inverse demand
curve of the fast and slow drivers are assumed to be equal to two hours. At the
minimum travel time of l/s1 demand for trips by fast drivers is taken to be equal to
1000, demand for trips by slow drivers equals 500 if travel time is equal to l/s2.
Optimal tolling at a high level of demand for trips (i) by slow drivers implies hardly
any difference with the situation of laissez faire (iv) in which there are no measures
for traffic control. In situation (i) the tolls are negligible for both types of drivers and
they have hardly any influence on demand or social surplus.
                                                                                                                                                              
shows that a decrease in the number of slow drivers from situation ii onwards will also increase total
social surplus
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Table 1 Four situations
Situation Number
of fast
drivers
per hour
P1
Number
of slow
drivers
per hour
P2
Travel
time
of fast
drivers
w1
Social
surplus
SS
toll on
fast
drivers
(hrs)
z1
Toll on
slow
drivers
(hrs)
z2
i Optimal tolling   977.97  499.27 0.1657 1355.6229 0.0006 0.0026
ii Suboptimal
tolling
  968.55    15.08 0.1396   919.4798 0.0132 1.7782
iii No slow drivers 1000.00      0.00 0.1250   937.5000 - -
iv Laissez faire   978.32  500.00 0.1657 1355.6218 - -
Legend. ‘Optimal tolling 1’ refers to optimal tolling at a high level of demand for trips by slow drivers,
‘Optimal  tolling 2’ to a low level .
In the second equilibrium with tolling (ii) the number of slow drivers is much smaller.
Travel time for the fast drivers decreases as a consequence, but consumer surplus also
falls considerably when compared to (i) and (iv). The value of the toll for slow drivers
is high: the monetary equivalent of 1,78 hours of time. The demand for trips by these
drivers falls to a level as low as 15 per hour. Nevertheless, the influence of these 15
drivers on the travel time of fast drivers is substantial as a comparison with the
situation without slow drivers on the road makes clear.
The table shows that in the present situation complete abandoning of slow drivers
(iii), which implies that toll revenues are zero, leads to a higher social surplus than (ii)
even though demand of fast drivers is now elastic.8 Situations (ii) and (iii) have a
substantially lower social surplus than (i) and (iv). Clearly, in the circumstances
considered here, even the slightest costs associated with tolling make laissez faire the
preferred alternative.
For other combinations of parameters the relative attractiveness of the alternatives
may be rather different. For instance, when the demand for slow traffic is much lower
than that for fast traffic, the ‘no slow drivers’ alternative (iii) may easily perform
better than the laissez faire alternative. The reason is that the loss of consumer surplus
by the slow group - when it is excluded from the road – is much smaller than in the
case of Table 1. Note also that the marginal external costs of slow drivers are very
high when there are only a few of them.
Relevance
In reality we see in the Netherlands that on the countryside there is a dense road
network connecting all houses and farms where all kinds of traffic are allowed. There
is also a coarser network of better roads, connecting the villages, where slow traffic
(tractors, bicycles, etc.) is sometimes not admitted.
The main motivation to separate slow and fast traffic in this situation relates to safety
(SWOV, 1990): speed differences are known to be an important determinant of
accidents. Our analysis reveals that this policy is also supported by considerations of
time losses and social welfare. As the analysis given above indicates, routes with a
very high demand of fast traffic can probably best be used exclusively for fast traffic
                                                       
8
 If demand becomes more elastic examples can be constructed in which (ii) has a slightly higher social
surplus than (iii).
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while the resulting welfare losses to slow traffic are moderate if there is a sufficiently
dense network of other roads on which it is allowed.
3 Two lane road, overtaking possible
In this section we analyze the changes that occur in the model of the preceding section
when we introduce the possibility of overtaking. We consider a road with two lanes
and traffic moving in opposite directions on both lanes. Overtaking is possible if a
sufficiently large gap occurs in the traffic moving in the opposite direction.
We assume that similar stochastic processes describe traffic on both lanes, although
some of the parameters may have different values.
The minimum required length of a gap
A fast driver on the right lane who overtakes a slow driver has to be able to use the
left lane for the time needed to complete the overtaking. Overtaking starts when the
nose of the fast car is at the minimum distance d* behind the car in front. The fast
driver switches to the left lane and overtakes the slow car at the high speed s1.9 The
fast driver moves back to the right lane as soon as the nose of his car is at the
minimum distance to the nose of the slow car that is overtaken. We abstract from
problems caused by the possibility that two slow drivers are driving behind each other
so close as to make it impossible to overtake them one by one.10 The time needed for
overtaking is therefore equal to that of proceeding 2d* meters at a speed s1-s2: 2d*/
(s1-s2). During this time the fast driver travels s12d*/ (s1-s2) meters. If the first
oncoming car on the left lane has speed s3 it travels s32d*/ (s1-s2) meters during the
same time. The required length of the gap in traffic on the left lane is therefore equal
to:
*2
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The speed s3 may be equal to s1 or s2, but may also be different.
Some assumptions
In order to keep the model tractable, we introduce a number of assumptions that differ
from those made in the previous section.
- We assume that if the relationship between demand and arrival rates is taken into
account as was done in equations 2 and 3, there is no need to deal explicitly with
interactions between fast drivers that are the result from platooning et cetera. In
section 2, this was a result established in the appendix. Here it is an assumption. It
may be possible to prove its validity also in the present situation, but we have not
done so.
- All cars on the left lane have the same speed s3. This allows us to derive
expressions for the probability that the length of a gap exceeds a certain value, for
the expected value of the time one has to wait until a sufficiently large gap occurs,
et cetera. Demand for trips on the left lane is denoted as P3 and it is assumed that
                                                       
9
 If the fast car was forced to slow down before overtaking started, speed switches to the high value at
the start of overtaking.
10
 This can be motivated by assuming that the last of these two slow drivers will throttle back in order
to enable the overtaking car to move to the right, if this is necessary because of oncoming traffic on the
other side of the road.
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the same minimum distance d* has to be maintained between cars on that side of
the road. The arrival rate O3 is therefore equal to P3/(1-P3/c).11
- We consider a steady state of traffic moving on a long road in which a fast driver
alternately drives at a high or a low speed. We therefore abstract from a special
feature of the model of the previous section: all fast cars that entered the road
could proceed at the high speed when entering the road.12
Average speed and average travel time
We now consider the average speed and travel time of a fast driver on the right hand
side of the road under the circumstances described above. His experience is a
sequence of events consisting of two parts:
- a period during which the high speed can be maintained that starts when a slow
car begins to be overtaken and ends when the distance to another slow car is
minimal, so that he has to slow down to s2,
- a period of driving at the low speed, until a sufficiently large gap occurs in traffic
moving in the opposite direction.
The average speed A(s) of the fast driver is therefore equal to a weighted average of
the high and the low speed, with the weights equal to the expected length of the
periods during which both speeds are used. Denoting these periods as M1 and M2, we
can write:
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For the average travel time per unit of distance, A(w) we find:
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In the appendix the following expressions for M1 and M2 are derived:
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Optimal tolls
For the marginal external costs the following equations can be derived easily from the
Lagrangean given in the appendix:
                                                       
11
 Although it would have been more satisfactory to treat traffic in both directions symmetrically, this
would also complicate our derivations considerably. The assumption of homogeneous traffic is easier
to use, and does probably not change the qualitative results.  The even simpler assumption of
deterministic arrival rates on the left lane would imply that it is either always possible or always
impossible to overtake between two subsequent cars, which is clearly not realistic.
12
 Note that the steady state in the model of the previous section is a situation in which all fast cars are
forced to slow down.
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We focus attention on the first and second group of drivers. Observe that A(w)
depends on P1 and P2 only through O2, while O2 appears only in M2. After some
elaboration we find:
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An example
As an example we take the same road segment as in section 2 and apply our new
assumptions. An alternative interpretation, that is unrealistic but may nevertheless be
helpful in interpreting the results, is to imagine a circular road with length of 10
kilometres where traffic moves continuously.  It is assumed in all Figures that traffic
on the left lane has a speed of 60 km/hr. Figure 6 shows the travel time of fast drivers
as a function of the demand of slow drivers for various values of the demand for trips
on the left lane. If that demand is very low, there is no congestion and travel time
equals l/s1. If the number of cars on the left lane increases, the travel time function
takes on the concave shape discussed in the previous section. For very high traffic
intensities on the left lane the travel time curve becomes flat again, but now at the
maximum value 1/s2. In contrast with the model of the previous section, travel time of
fast drivers will ultimately be equal to l/s2 for every positive value of the demand for
trips by slow drivers. This is a consequence of our steady-state assumption: if
overtaking is impossible and there are slow drivers on the road, every fast driver will
ultimately be forced to slow down.
Although the assumptions that underlie both figures are somewhat different, we can
get some idea of the effect of introducing the possibility of overtaking when we
compare Figures 6 and 2. Figure 2 showed that the presence of even a small number
of slow drivers increased travel time of the fast drivers considerably. In Figure 6 we
find that travel time of fast drivers remains close to its minimum value, even in the
presence of a large number of slow drivers, as long as traffic intensity on the left lane
is low. If there is much traffic on the left lane the possibilities for overtaking
disappear and the resulting situation is similar to that studied in the previous section.
Note that most of the lines drawn in Figure 6 are strictly concave and the others are
straight lines. This suggests of course that optimal tolls will in the present
circumstances also be decreasing for small volumes of demand for trips by slow
drivers and almost equal to zero for higher levels of demand. Figure 7 confirms this
conjecture (note that the scale of the horizontal axis differs from that of Figure 6).
As noted above, a special feature of the model of this section is that the travel time
function becomes flat if there are many cars on the left lane. This makes one expect
17
Figure 6 The relationship between travel time of fast drivers and the number of slow
drivers on the right lane for various numbers of drivers on the left lane.
Figure 7  The relationship between the marginal external cost of slow drivers and the
number of fast drivers on the right lane for various numbers of drivers on the left
lane.
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that optimal tolls become flat for high traffic intensities on the left lane. Figure 7
confirms this: if there are 1500 cars per hour on the left lane, the marginal external
cost is (much) lower than if there are 1250 cars per hour. If the number of cars on the
left lane increases to still higher values, optimal tolls are negligible even for extremely
low numbers of slow drivers.
External effects of traffic moving in the opposite direction
In figure 8 we look at the relation between the number of drivers per hour on the left
lane and the travel time of fast drivers on the right lane. The curves drawn refer to
various numbers of drivers per hour on the right line. In all cases the number of slow
drivers is one third of this total, the others are fast drivers. As before, we assume that
all drivers on the left lane drive at 60 km/hr.
For very small traffic intensities on the right lane travel time of fast drivers on the
right lane is almost equal to its minimum until traffic on the left lane becomes so
intense that overtaking becomes impossible. Then it increases rapidly to the maximum
travel time (remember the steady state context of the present model). For higher
volumes of traffic on the right lane the curves start to increase earlier and approach
the maximum value gradually.
Figure 8 The relationship between travel time of fast drivers on the right lane and the
number of drivers on the left lane for various numbers of drivers on the right lane
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Figure 9 The relationship between the marginal external cost of drivers on the left
lane and their number for various numbers of drivers on the right lane
The marginal external cost imposed by drivers on the left lane on drivers on the right
lane is shown in Figure 9. This figure has been constructed on the basis of numerical
differentiation. (Analytical methods can be used for elaborating the third of equations
15 but imply tedious derivations). Note that the curves shown in Figure 9 refer to the
slope of the corresponding line in Figure 8, multiplied by the number of fast drivers
on the right side of the road. That is the reason why the marginal external costs are
always virtually equal to zero when the number of drivers on the right side equals 0,
even though the corresponding line in Figure 8 increases rapidly when the number of
drivers on the left side is approximately 1300.
For larger numbers of drivers on the right lane, marginal external costs become larger,
even though the corresponding curves in Figure 8 are less steep. For 100 drivers per
hour on the right lane, the marginal external cost reaches a maximum when
approximately a quarter of the capacity of the left lane is used. A comparison with
Figure 8 makes clear that overtaking becomes almost impossible at that level of
demand on the left lane.
At higher levels of traffic demand on the right lane, external costs of cars on the left
hand side are more substantial and the peak of the curves shown in Figure 9 shifts to
the left. The peak also becomes less pronounced and disappears for very high
numbers of drivers on the right lane.
Relevance
We conclude that introducing the possibility of overtaking does not change the
essence of the conclusions we drew in section 2. Tolling of slow drivers does not
seem to be a promising policy since, depending on the number of slow drivers, the
alternatives ‘laissez faire’ and ‘no slow drivers’ are probably almost as good in terms
of total welfare and are much easier to implement.
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However, there is an additional element in the model where overtaking is allowed:
drivers on the left lane generate external costs on the fast drivers on the right lane
because they hinder overtaking. Figure 9 shows that only in the case that the right lane
is very busy and the left lane is very quiet, the marginal external costs of the left lane
drivers are considerable. This suggests that only in this case it makes sense to impose
a toll on users of the left lane. However, if the number of drivers on the left lane is
small, the policy of not allowing them to enter the lane would yield a welfare result
that is not far from imposing an optimal toll and clearly better than the ‘laissez faire’
alternative.
A real world example that looks like this situation is the morning peak with large
traffic flows in one direction and small flows in the other. The instrument of switch
lanes (used for traffic in one direction during the morning peak and for traffic in the
other direction during the afternoon peak) comes close to this outcome of allocating
road capacity exclusively for drivers in one direction.
Another obvious conclusion that follows from the analysis is that imposition of a ban
on overtaking leads to very small time losses when traffic is heavy in both directions,
whereas the gains in terms of improved safety (not addressed in this paper) may be
substantial.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we analysed congestion caused by speed differences in situations where
two groups of drivers with different preferred speeds use a single lane. This relatively
simple situation allowed us to develop a structural model of this type of congestion.
Our main result is that this model indicates that the relationship between marginal
external costs and numbers of drivers are much different from the increasing convex
curves familiar from the Pigou-Knight analysis. In section 2 we considered the case in
which overtaking is impossible and found that marginal external costs of slow drivers
are a decreasing function of their number, while optimal tolls for this group are
virtually zero, unless their number is small. Clearly tolling is not a very useful policy
in this situation. We suggested that the actual policy, which prohibits slow traffic
entering some primary roads, while allowing all kinds of traffic on a denser network
of secondary roads might be optimal.
In section 3 we found that introduction of the possibility of overtaking changes some
aspects of the model, but not the downward sloping relationship between the marginal
external costs of slow drivers and their number. Moreover, we found that the
relationship between marginal external cost and the number of drivers on the left lane
is only monotonous when the number of drivers on the right lane is close to the
capacity of that lane. Then we find again that these costs are a decreasing function of
the number of cars. For lower numbers of drivers on the right side, we find that these
marginal external costs are initially an increasing concave function of their number,
reach a maximum and then decrease towards zero.
A conclusion that can be drawn from our analyses is that tolling slow drivers tends to
have rather small effects on total welfare. Depending on the number of slow drivers,
the alternatives ‘laissez faire’ or ‘no slow drivers’ are almost as good in terms of total
welfare and probably better if the costs of implementation are also taken into account.
Although our results refer to a special and simplified situation, they are nevertheless
interesting because they suggest that it may be quite worthwhile to develop a more
structural analysis of congestion and the appropriate policy instruments to deal with it.
Especially in situations where congestion is not related to the existence of a
bottleneck (for this situation a well-developed structural model exists), this may result
21
in new insights. The traditional Pigou-Knight analysis which is commonly used as a
kind of benchmark model for thinking about congestion in such situations suggests a
relationship which turns out to be quite different from the one studied in this paper.
Finally, we would like to stress that our analysis does not refer to a theoretical
curiosity, but is likely to have policy relevance. Our examples were constructed so as
to resemble the traffic situation on roads (not highways) outside the main cities in the
Netherlands, which is probably close to that in comparable areas in most other
advanced economies. Congestion caused by speed differences may also occur because
of interaction between various traffic modes. A typically Dutch example would be the
interaction between cyclists and automobile drivers. In the Netherlands the (parts of)
the infrastructure used by cars and cyclists are often separated, but in other countries
interaction between cars and slower traffic modes seems to be an important source of
congestion, especially in large cities.
22
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Appendix
A1 Expected travel time for fast drivers when overtaking is impossible.
We start the analysis by introducing an additional simplifying assumption, which will
be dropped later on. The assumption states that all cars can be considered as points
(i.e. do not occupy road space) and can approach each other indefinitely close.
Consider a fast driver who enters the road and let W be the time that elapsed since the
last slow driver before him entered the road segment. This slow car has therefore
traveled  s2W kilometers when the fast driver enters. The distance between the fast and
the slow driver will start to decrease immediately and after s2W/(s1-s2) time units it is
equal to zero. The fast car will then have traveled s1 s2W/(s1-s2) kilometers. If this
number exceeds the length of the road l the fast car will not experience congestion.
Total travel time w is then equal to l/s1. The critical value for W can be derived as l(s1-
s2)/s1s2=l/s2-l/s1.
If W is smaller than this critical value, the fast car will be forced to move at a low
speed for the last l-Ws1s2/(s1-s2) kilometers of the road. Total travel time can then be
computed as:
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A standard result from the theory of Poisson processes says that W is distributed
exponentially with parameter O2. It should be recalled that this refers only to the case
with W below the critical value.
If X is a random variable with an exponential distribution (with parameterO) that is
truncated at k, its expected value can be derived as follows:
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The expected value of travel time for a fast driver is:
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The second line results from application of the formula derived above to the case with
X=W, O=O2 and k=l/s2-l/s1.
Now we drop the assumption that cars do not occupy any space and assume that a
distance d* between (the noses of) subsequent cars is always maintained.  This results
in two complications:
- a Poisson process is no longer suitable as a model for arrivals since it implies that
two cars can enter at (almost) the same time
- the number of fast cars between an arbitrary fast car and the first slow car in front
of it becomes of importance, since it determines the location where the fast car has
to switch to the speed.
Arrival of cars is now modeled as a source that can be on and off. If the source is on, a
car arrives after a time that is distributed exponentially with parameter  O1 + O2. After
a car arrives, the source will be off for d*/s2 times units. This guarantees that that the
first d* meters of the road are always free if the source is on. (It is possible to change
this second characteristic in such a way that the source will be off for a smaller
number of time until if a fast car arrives, but this complicates the derivations while
and adds nothing significant to the analysis.)
Now consider a fast car that is entering the road. In order to determine the location
where speed has to switch to the lower value, notice the following facts:
1
 
the number of fast cars that entered the road after the last slow car that entered
plus that slow car itself is distributed geometrically with parameter O2/(O1+O2).
Call this number K.
2
 
if K=k, then the distance between the fast car and the slow car at the moment the
former has to switch to the low speed is kd*.
3
 
The random variable i
K
i X1 6 , with the Xi’s mutually independent exponentially
distributed with parameter O and K geometrically distributed with parameter p, is
exponentially distributed with parameter Op.
We now determine the location of the slow car, conditional upon K=k. This location
is s2T with T the elapsed time since the slow car entered the road. Conditional upon
K=k we have:
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This equation expresses the fact that the time between subsequent starts equals
d*/s2+Xi, where Xi is distributed exponentially with parameter (O1+O2). The location L
of  the slow car is therefore:
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Making use of fact 2, we know that the fast car has to reduce speed when the distance
to the preceding slow car equals kd*. The time during which the fast speed can be
maintained is therefore equal to the time it takes to reduce the distance to the slow car
by s26 Xi=Ts meters. This time is equal to:
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Now use fact 3, with O=O1+O2 and p=O2/(O1+O2). This implies:
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with Ts* distributed exponentially with parameter O2. Notice that this derivation is still
conditional upon k.
In order to complete the derivation of the distribution of the travel time of the fast car,
one additional assumption has to be made. If the slow car in front of the fast cars
leaves the road, which speed will the fast cars immediately behind it use until they
leave the road? We assume that they maintain the low speed s2. We now complete the
derivation by observing that during the first Ts time units the car has speed s1 while
during the remaining time units speed will be s2. The distance traveled after Ts time
units is ((s1s2)/(s1-s2))Ts* kilometers. If this is larger than l, travel time is l/s1,
otherwise l-((s1s2)/(s1-s2))Ts* kilometers have to be traveled with speed s2. Analogous
to the derivation under the simplified assumptions, the following conclusions may be
drawn:
a)
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b) W has the same distribution function as l/s2-Z, with Z an exponentially
distributed distribution which is truncated at (s1-s2)l/(s1s2).
In other words the distribution of W is equal to that derived under the earlier
simplifying assumption. This could have been conjectured already because of the
cancellation of the two complicating factors in the formula for Ts*: the random
variable K does not appear in it. The expected value for W may therefore be written
as:
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and this is equation 4 of the main text.
Before concluding this part of the appendix we observe some less obvious properties
of this function.
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(the second line makes use of l’Hopital’s rule).
d) w1 is increasing in O2. This should of course be expected, but it is not completely
obvious from the equation. The first order derivative is:
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with A= l/s2 – l/s1. We have to show that this is positive. Observe that for O2=0, the
expression in brackets is positive. Computation of the relevant partial derivative of the
expression in brackets shows that it is increasing in O2. Thus we conclude that
wE1(w)wO2 is positive for positive values of O2. It follows that wE1(w)wO2 is always
positive for O2 nonnegative. Moreover, it can be shown that:
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which is also positive.
e) w1 is a concave function of O2. The second order derivative of w1 is:
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The expression between curled brackets is positive. The sum of the first two terms has
been shown to be positive when determining the sign of wE1(w)wO2 and the third term
is clearly also positive.
A2 Optimal tolls
In order to derive the optimal tolls, we maximize the sum of the consumer surpluses
of the two groups of drivers, plus the toll revenues under the side conditions that the
generalized travel costs are equal to the sum of time costs and toll at the optimum.
The Lagrangian is:
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where the last two terms refer to the constraints that both P1 and P2 should be
nonnegative. If demand of both fast and slow drivers is positive, the two G-s are zero,
and the solution given in the text (eq. 10) can be obtained easily.
In order to analyze the possibility that one or both demands are zero at the optimum,
observe:
- that the sum of the consumer surpluses will be zero when both demands are zero,
which is never optimal as long as (at least) one of  the two surpluses is positive
with both tolls equal to zero,
- that it can never be optimal to set demand by fast drivers equal to zero if
g1(0)>l/s2, since the presence of fast drivers do not cause congestion for slow
drivers.
This implies that in the situation in which g1(0)>l/s2 and g2(0)>l/s2 (i.e. both surpluses
are positive in a situation without tolling), the only possible corner solution is the one
in which demand by slow drivers equal to zero.
In such a situation there will be no congestion for the fast drivers, which implies that
their toll equals 0. The toll for slow drivers is so high as to imply w2+z2>g2(0).
Since in practice the travel time for fast drivers becomes close to w2 if slow drivers
are allowed to drive on the road, what the foregoing essentially implies is that there is
a choice between two equilibria:
a) an equilibrium in which both fast and slow drivers are admitted to enter the road,
and travel times for both are practically equal to w2=l/s2, while tolls are practically
equal to zero,
b) an equilibrium in which only fast drivers are admitted to enter the road,, and their
travel time equals l/s1, while slow drivers do not enter the road because of a
prohibitively high toll.
For the computation of the first partial derivative, wE1(w)wO2, we use equation 5. The
result can be written as:
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with A= l/s2 – l/s1. Note that the partial derivative wE1(w)wO2 depends on demand
from both fast and slow drivers through the arrival rate O2.
We use equation 3 in order to compute the other two derivatives that we need:
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These derivatives have been written in this particular way in order to bring out clearly
that the toll for slow drivers is always larger than that for the fast drivers and
especially so in situations in which the road is not heavily used (c-(P1+P2) is large)
and demand for trips from slow drivers (P2) is low.
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A3 Derivations for the situation with overtaking
In this part of the appendix we derive expressions for M1 and M2, the expected values
of the periods during which the high and low speeds are used. We start with M1.
If a slow car is overtaken, the fast driver drives a distance of at least 2d* at the high
speed. The distance between two slow cars is exponentially distributed with parameter
O2/s2. The expected value of this distance is therefore s2/O2. Note also that the fast car
that overtakes a slow car uses already d* units of this distance as soon as overtaking is
completed.13 The distance that can be traveled at the high speed before another slow
car has to be overtaken or speed has to be reduced is therefore on average equal to
d*+s2/O2. The time involved for the fast driver will be denoted as W1:
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If the distance to the next slow car becomes minimal, the high speed can only be
maintained if overtaking can start immediately. We therefore have to determine the
probability S1 that there is a sufficiently large gap in traffic on the left lane at the
moment the fast driver needs to start overtaking. To do so, first observe that
overtaking can never take place if there is another car present on the left lane at the
location where overtaking must start. The probability that such a situation occurs is
equal to d*/(d*+s3/O3).14 If no car is present at the location on the left lane where
overtaking has to start, the distance to the first car on the left lane has to be equal to or
greater than g. The probability that this is the case equals exp(-O3 g/s3). We therefore
find:
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Finally, we have to take into account that the total length of the period during which
the high speed can be maintained is a multiple of  (sub)periods with expected duration
W1:
...
)1(3
)1(2
)1(
1
2
11
111
111


 
SSW
SSW
SWM
and this can be elaborated as follows:
                                                       
13
 We ignore complications that may arise from the possibility that two slow cars are so close to each
other that overtaking them one by one is impossible. We simply assume that that the last of these slow
cars throttles back in order to give the overtaking car enough distance to remove to the right lane if this
is necessary and moves back to the original position behind the first of the two slow cars as soon as
possible.
14
 The length of a car has here been taken equal to d*.
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We move on to the derivation of M2. Such a period starts when a fast car is forced to
slow down. Immediate overtaking may be impossible either because the left hand side
is occupied by a car moving in the opposite direction, or because a car on the left lane
is within distance g.  In the first case, the expected value of the time until a gap occurs
on the left lane equals d*/2(s2+s3), which is small, and we ignore this part of the total
delay in what follows.
If a car is approaching on the left lane within distance g, the expected time until it
passes the fast driver who is forced to slow down on the right lane is equal to
E(x|x<g)/(s2+s3). We elaborate the expected value:
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If it is taken into account that the fast driver also has to wait until the oncoming car
has passed, we can write down the expected value of the time W2 it takes until the first
oncoming car is passed and overtaking may become possible:
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The probability S2 that the gap that follows the first oncoming car will be at least
equal to g equals:
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The expected value M2 of the period during which speed has to be equal to s2 can now
be written as:
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and this can be elaborated to:
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In order to show that the expression for the expected values of speed and travel time
are appropriate, call t1 the time during which speed s1 can be maintained and  t2 the
time during which the lower speed s2 is relevant. Let n be the number of events. The
total number of kilometres driven during n events is:
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whereas the total time this takes is:
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Average speed equals the ratio of (i) and (ii), and if numerator and denominator are
both divided by the number of events n, we find the following expression for average
speed:
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Now observe that:
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and the result for A(s) follows by taking the limit of (iii) for nof. The result for
A(w) is derived similarly from the expression for the ratio of the total time spend
travelling during n events and the number of kilometers driven, i.e. the inverse of (iii).
A4 Optimal tolls when overtaking is possible
Again, we maximize social surplus. Now we have three groups of drivers. The
Lagrangean is:
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(where we ignore the nonnegativity constraints).
The travel times of the drivers belonging to groups 2 and 3 are constant. The travel
time of drivers belonging to group 1 is equal to w1 =l A(w) cf. equation 15 of the main
text, with l the length of the road. Hence  w1 is a function of the arrival rates O2 and O3
and, through them, of the demands P1, P2 and P3.
